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围绕经济发展的地区竞争是中国过去四十余年改革开放进程中极具中国特色的关键元素。在梳理和总结文献的基础上，本文首先考察了中国地区竞争的历史演变、主要特点及制度成因，指出地方官员之间的晋升竞争与地方企业之间的市场竞争是地区竞争的主要驱动力量。然后，本文探讨了地区竞争对中国特色的政经互动过程所产生的重大影响，并聚焦于三个独特影响：一是塑造了集公共性、竞争性与市场性于一身的地方政府；二是打造了“中央政府—地方政府—市场”三位一体的政府—市场关系；三是促成了地区增长联盟和政企之间基于政绩—业绩纽带的合作关系。
Abstract：Regional competition surrounding economic development has been a critical element with distinctive Chinese characteristics during the reform and opening-up process over the past four decades. Based on a review and synthesis of existing literature, this paper first examines the historical evolution, key features, and institutional causes of regional competition in China, pointing out that promotion competition among local officials and market competition among local enterprises are the main driving forces. Subsequently, the paper explores significant impacts of regional competition on the political-economic interaction process with Chinese characteristics, focusing on three unique effects: first, it has shaped local governments that integrate three key roles of public service providers, competitive players, and market-participants; second, it has created a trinity government-market relationship involving the central government, local governments, and the market, rather than a traditional dichotomy between government and market; third, it has facilitated the formation of regional growth alliances and a government-business cooperative relationship based on the nexus between political achievements and economic performance.
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(1)参见黄奇帆(2020)。
(2)以DeepSeek为代表的“杭州六小龙”引起国内外媒体关注之后,深圳、苏州、成都等多个城市的地方政府深刻反思为什么本地没有出现“杭州六小龙”,为什么一些创业者曾在本地开创事业,最终却没有选择在本地继续发展。这样的反思和疑问很少在别的国家出现。例如美国OpenAI在加州创业成功,但没有引发纽约、波士顿或其他大城市的地方政府类似中国地方官员这样的反思和追问。
(3)事实上,除了产值和投资以外,财税收入长期以来是官员经济绩效考核体系当中的重要指标,当我们看到地方政府热衷于以各种优惠政策吸引那些“利税大户”来本地投资,我们很难就此认定这是地方政府财税最大化激励的有力证据,它也有可能是地方官员受政绩考核之下晋升激励所驱动的结果。
(4)例如美国州政府之间也存在招商引资竞争,为了吸引一些大企业(如亚马逊)落户,州政府竞相提供优惠的税收政策。Besley and Case (1995)也发现美国各州的选民倾向于将本州政治家的经济表现与别的州政府进行对比。但这更接近于一种标尺竞争(yardstick competition),而非晋升锦标赛竞争。前者是每个代理人面临众多委托人的评价,委托人借助一个代理人的业绩表现去判断另一个代理人的表现的好坏,而后者是一个委托人收集相关信息同时考核多个代理人的绩效。两者之间的详细区别参见周黎安(2007)。
(5)关于晋升锦标赛如何引发中国特色的政经互动过程,现有文献展开了丰富细致的研究,参见周黎安(2022)有关方面的文献综述,此处不再赘述。
(6)例如Cull et al.(2017),发现地方政府为了提高本地企业的市场竞争力而为其提供各类支持性政策。
(7)黄宗智强调“第三领域”处于国家与社会之间,这里强调的是地方政府介于政府与市场之间。
(8)关于制度化与人格化互动如何随地方官员的层级和企业规模的相对大小而变化,请参见周黎安(2021)。
基本信息:
中图分类号:D630;F124
引用信息:
[1]周黎安.地区竞争与中国特色的政经互动[J].政府与市场经济研究,2025,1(01):76-93.
2025-12-15
2025-12-15