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本文从政府与市场经济学的角度分析加密货币与区块链技术，核心观点是加密货币难以取代主权货币，而区块链技术具有广泛的应用前景。近年来，随着区块链技术的快速发展，加密货币正逐渐成为不容忽视的新兴数字资产，这对政府职能与角色的转变提出了新的要求。本文指出，加密货币难以成为主流货币，尽管其受到广泛关注并在一些国家得到应用，但在可预见的未来，尚不足以构成对主流货币体系的实质性挑战。主要原因在于，加密货币价格波动剧烈，因跨境监管缺位易被用于非法交易，并未创造出此前货币体系所不具备的全新职能，也难以充分发挥货币的各项既有职能。此外，加密货币还削弱了传统货币政策的有效性，影响融资资源配置，容易导致杠杆过度累积并引发金融风险。然而，作为其底层架构的区块链技术则大有可为，在选举、医疗、物流及拍卖等诸多领域拥有广阔的应用前景。最后，本文从政府与市场关系的视角分析，认为在区块链技术与加密资产兴起过程中，政府应调整其职能与角色，从直接投入财政资源、深度介入，转向聚焦审慎监管，有效约束过度杠杆化行为，防范金融风险的累积与扩散。
Abstract：This paper analyzes cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology from the perspective of government and economics. Its core argument is that cryptocurrencies are unlikely to replace sovereign currencies, whereas blockchain technology holds broad prospects for development. In recent years, with the rapid development of blockchain technology, cryptocurrencies have gradually emerged as digital assets that can no longer be ignored, placing new demands on the transformation of government functions and roles. This paper argues that cryptocurrencies are unlikely to become mainstream currencies: although they have attracted widespread attention and have been used in some countries, they are still far from posing a substantive challenge to the traditional monetary system in the foreseeable future. The main reasons are as follows. Cryptocurrency prices are highly volatile and, given the absence of cross-border regulation, cryptocurrencies are readily used for illicit transactions; moreover, cryptocurrencies have neither created any new monetary function that the existing monetary system does not possess, nor have they been able to fully perform the various established functions of money. In addition, cryptocurrencies weaken the effectiveness of traditional monetary policy, affect the allocation of financing, and tend to induce excessive leverage accumulation and trigger financial risks. Blockchain technology, however, as their underlying architecture, holds considerable promise, with broad application prospects in fields such as elections, healthcare, logistics, and auctions. Finally, from the perspective of the relationship between government and the market, this paper argues that, amid the rise of blockchain technology and crypto assets, governments should adjust their functions and roles, shifting from deep involvement through direct fiscal investment to a primary focus on prudential regulation, effectively constraining excessive leverage and preventing the accumulation and propagation of financial risks.
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(1)Huberman et al.(2021)细致刻画了比特币去中心化设计的独特经济结构,指出这种设计可以保护用户免受传统支付机构垄断定价的影响,却会产生拥堵带来的效率损失。
(2)John et al.(2022)指出,比特币的主要经济意义在于以去中心化的方式解决了双重支付问题。鉴于主权货币危机与政府信用崩塌的历史教训,Raskin et al.(2024)的理论模型显示,在货币治理薄弱的新兴市场,私人数字货币提供了主权货币之外的替代选择,可以通过货币竞争对政府形成纪律约束。
(3)Liu and Tsyvinski(2021)构建了加密货币指数,发现其日收益率波动幅度接近同期股票市场的六倍;加密货币的收益对传统金融市场的多种已知风险因子无显著暴露,而与时间序列动量效应及投资者关注度等因素密切相关。Liu et al.(2022)较早将资产定价方法拓展至加密货币研究,构建了类比Fama-French的加密货币三因子模型(市场因子、规模因子与动量因子),发现该模型可以显著解释加密货币的横截面收益差异。与比特币相比,稳定币在一定程度上通过价值锚定降低了波动性,但并非没有波动风险,其稳定性高度依赖储备资产的类型与质量,在极端情况下仍可能发生脱锚乃至崩盘,2022年UST归零即为警示。稳定币在二级市场亦会偏离面值(Aldasoro et al.,2025),从而削弱其作为支付工具的可靠性。与比特币相比,稳定币虽然更易纳入传统监管框架,但其跨境属性仍带来显著的监管协调问题。
(4)在Alvarez et al.(2022)的全国代表性调查中,仅约20%的成年受访者在花完30美元奖励后继续使用Chivo;在受访商户中,仅约20%实际接受比特币支付,其中88%会将收到的比特币立即兑换为美元。
(5)Baur and Dimpfl(2021)的实证研究表明,比特币波动率接近美元对欧元、日元等主要汇率波动率的十倍,极端波动使其无法稳定充当交换媒介。
(6)Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches(2019)讨论了私人货币和法定货币的竞争问题,在Lagos and Wright(2005)框架下引入可以发行私人货币来最大化效用的企业家,指出私人货币体系不能提供社会最优的货币供给,当政府发行的货币与私人货币竞争时,货币政策将受到约束。Pagnotta(2022)发现,比特币价格与安全性的反馈机制会放大基本面冲击带来的波动,催生与基本面无关的暴涨暴跌;比特币的货币机制会造成福利损失,同时导致对货币数量论的偏离。比特币能否持续作为替代货币,取决于其能否维持足够的安全水平、相对接受程度及其抗通胀能力。在存在本国货币和国际加密货币的两国开放经济模型中,Benigno et al.(2022)发现,如果两个国家均使用国际加密货币,则两国名义利率必须相等,导致货币政策趋同(Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization);如果加密货币以计息资产为支撑,独立货币政策、固定汇率和资本自由流动更加难以同时实现。因此,加密货币的普及可能限制央行对货币政策的管控。Benigno(2023)分析了私人货币如何发挥交易媒介作用,指出多种货币的存在会削弱中央银行控制价格和利率的能力,影响货币政策的实施效果,具体而言,当私人货币的供给不断增加时,政府仍能保持对价格水平的控制,但如果私人货币供给不变或降低,私人货币流通领域就可能出现泡沫,进而使政府失去对价格水平的控制能力。
(7)2021年11月至2022年11月比特币跌幅高达76.4%。Clark and Mihailov(2019)认为,比特币等加密货币的波动率前所未有且极高,无法满足国际储备资产对币值稳定、充足流动性与广泛信任的要求;相比之下,央行数字货币由中央银行集中发行、以国家信用背书,具备可兑换性、稳定性与效率,理论上可以履行货币与国际储备的双重职能;反事实分析显示,加密货币不适合作为储备资产。Budish(2025)指出,比特币难以发挥大规模价值储存功能;如果比特币变得像黄金一样重要,其安全成本将变得不可承受,系统本身将面临被攻击者控制的风险;一旦此类去中心化信任机制在全球金融体系中占据较高比重,维持信任的安全成本甚至会超过全球GDP。
(8)2018年5月,美国西弗吉尼亚州率先在其两个郡的初选中试点区块链投票,海外选民与军队服役人员通过波士顿Voatz公司开发的区块链应用平台进行投票(Nasdaq,2018)。
(9)2019年美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)选定IBM、沃尔玛、毕马威与默克四家公司参与药品供应链安全试点,该试点基于许可链的区块链系统,旨在追踪美国境内处方药与疫苗的分发,以缩短库存追踪所需时间,提高网络成员间数据共享的准确性(Walmart,2019)。2016年,沃尔玛的一个团队对一袋芒果片溯源需要耗时近一周,而与IBM合作建立基于区块链技术的食品溯源系统后,溯源时间缩短为仅2.2秒(Walmart,2021)。马士基公司与IBM于2017年合作建立了基于区块链技术的TradeLens供应链平台,用于追踪货船与集装箱的运输信息,尽管该平台因商业化困难于2023年停止运营,但其展示的多方协作数据共享基础设施模式仍是区块链技术在航运领域应用的标志性探索。2021年,八家航运与港口企业共同发起全球航运商业网络(GSBN),其首个区块链应用Cargo Release已在中国多个港口实现提货单证的无纸化流转,将货物单证就绪时间从数天缩短至几个小时(GSBN,2021)。
(10)例如,若三家公司分别出价1000万、800万与500万美元,则出价1000万美元者获胜,仅支付800万美元。
(11)不过,第二价格密封拍卖在实践中并非总能奏效,新西兰1990年的频谱拍卖即采用第二价格密封拍卖设计,却因多个牌照分别拍卖导致策略扭曲,实际收入远低于预期,甚至出现最高报价10万新西兰元、次高报价仅6新西兰元的极端情况,事后被视为第二价格密封拍卖机制失效的典型案例(McMillan,1994;Crandall,1998)。美国联邦通信委员会(FCC)则于1994年举行首场频谱拍卖,采用同步升价拍卖而非第二价格密封拍卖机制,该场拍卖最终筹得约6.17亿美元(Milgrom,2004)。
(12)针对政府参与经济活动的适度性问题,已有大量实证研究。衡量政府参与经济的一个常用指标是政府支出占GDP的比例。Barro(1990)的内生增长模型显示,当生产性政府支出占GDP比例超过最优规模时,过高的支出会通过扭曲性税收渠道抑制经济增长。大量跨国实证研究进一步发现,政府支出与经济增长之间存在显著的倒U形关系。Asimakopoulos and Karavias(2016)对129个国家的面板分析表明,政府最终消费支出的最优比例约为GDP的18%,低于阈值时政府规模扩张推动经济增长,超过阈值后则会显著抑制增长,从而支持了Barro(1990)的理论预测。Hajamini and Falahi(2018)对14个欧洲工业化国家的研究亦得出16.63%的较为接近的最优值。上述估计共同表明,一旦政府规模超越特定阈值,资源配置效率将趋于恶化,拖累经济增长。
(13)Laffont and Tirole(1993)建立的激励性规制理论将委托-代理框架引入政府监管,研究了信息不对称情况下的最优契约设计。
(14)Li and Maskin(2021)基于长期历史数据指出,工业革命以来,市场经济中政府的规模和涉及范围大幅扩张,政府支出占GDP的平均比重从19世纪中期约10%上升至当前约39%,文章特别考察了美国、德国、日本、韩国与中国等经济体在经济高速增长过程中政府发挥重要推动作用的典型案例。当然,从美国经济发展的传统范式来看,历来存在较强的减少政府干预的呼声;相较于欧洲大陆与东亚主要经济体,政府在市场运行中发挥的调控作用整体而言相对有限。
(15)2022年3月,拜登政府签署首份针对数字资产的行政命令《关于确保负责任地发展数字资产的行政命令》(The White House,2022),将加密货币、稳定币与中央银行数字货币统一纳入政策框架,提出在管控风险的同时保持美国在全球数字资产领域的领先地位。然而,2025年1月23日,新一届特朗普政府以《加强美国在数字金融技术领域的领导地位》行政命令撤销了上述命令,禁止任何机构在美国境内外发行或推广中央银行数字货币,并废除拜登政府时期的数字资产政策框架,释放出放松对私人数字货币监管的明确信号。2025年3月签署的《设立战略比特币储备与美国数字资产储备库》(The White House,2025)进一步将执法部门没收的比特币与其他数字资产分别纳入战略比特币储备与美国数字资产储备库。2025年7月,《指导与建立美国稳定币国家创新法案》(U.S.Congress,2025)签署生效,成为美国首部针对稳定币的综合性联邦立法,规定支付型稳定币须与美元一比一兑付并纳入联邦金融监管,以巩固美元全球储备货币地位。
基本信息:
中图分类号:TP311.13;F821;F49
引用信息:
[1]埃里克·马斯金.论加密货币的局限性及区块链技术的发展前景：政府与市场经济学的分析视角[J].政府与市场经济研究,2026,2(03):1-20.
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